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ARTICLES
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Richard Plendert
Few general principles of the law of the European Union'
are better established than the principle of equality or non-dis-
crimination, and few are more widely abused. It is now to be
considered as axiomatic that the principle of equality, and the
cognate principle of non-discrimination, form part of the gen-
eral framework of the law to be applied by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (hereinafter "Court of Justice")
and by other courts concerned with the administration of the
t Queen's Counsel, London, LL.D. (Cambridge, England).
1 The European Union was established by the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
[MAASTRICHT TREATY], Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, 12 U.K.T.S. Cm. 2485 (1994). It
comprises three "pillars." The first pillar consists of the three European Communi-
ties: the Coal and Steel Community (TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY] Paris, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140); the
Atomic Energy Community (TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
[EURATOM TREATY] Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167); and the European
Economic Community (TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY [EEC TREATY], Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. For the text of the EC
Treaty as amended by the Maastricht Treaty, see 1 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 573
(1992). For further reading see L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, (4th ed. 1990); R. PLENDER & J. USHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3d ed. 1993); D. WYATT & A.
DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d ed. 1993); L.N. BROWN & T. KENNEDY,
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1994); T. HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d ed. 1994).
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law of the Union.2 In W. Ferrario and Others v. Commission of
the European Communities,3 the Court of Justice stated
the general principle of equality is one of the fundamental princi-
ples of the law of the Community civil service. That principle re-
quires that comparable situations shall not be treated differently
unless such differentiation is objectively justified.4
In Sermide v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others5 the
Court of Justice noted that:
under the principle of non-discrimination between Community
producers or consumers, which is enshrined in the second subpar-
agraph of Article 40(3) of the EEC Treaty and which includes the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down
in the first paragraph of Article 7 of the EEC Treaty, comparable
situations must not be treated differently and different situations
must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is
objectively justified (emphasis added).6
The principles of equality and non-discrimination apply in
numerous and disparate contexts. As regards the staff of the
European institutions, these principles require that there
should be no distinction based on gender in respect of payment
of expatriation allowances; 7 or in respect of pensions benefits;8
and that interviews should not be fixed inflexibly so as to place
2 There is attached to the Court of Justice the Court of First Instance, with
jurisdiction, subject to appeal to the Court of Justice, to deal with issues of Com-
munity law other than actions against Member States and references from na-
tional courts and tribunals of questions of Community law for resolution by means
of preliminary rulings. Issues of Community law commonly arise before national
courts and tribunals in the Member States, which are obliged to give relief notably
where that law "produces direct effect" on which individuals may rely. In courts of
other States, issues of Community law arise as foreign law.
3 Joined Cases 152, 158, 162, 166, 170, 173, 175, 177 to 179, 182 & 186/81, W.
Ferrario and Others v. Commission of the European Communties, 1983 E.C.R.
2357.
4 Id. at 2367.
5 Case 106/83, Sermide v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero and Others, 1984
E.C.R. 4209. See also Case 139/77, Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Finanzamt
Warendorf, 1978 E.C.R. 1317, 1333; Case 106/81, Julius Kind v. European Eco-
nomic Community, 1982 E.C.R. 2885, 2919.
6 Sermide, 1984 E.C.R. at 4231.
7 Case 20/71, Luisa Sabbatini n~e Bertoni v. European Parliament, 1972
E.C.R. 345.
8 Joined Cases 75 & 117/82, C. Razzouk and A. Beydoun v. Commission, 1984
E.C.R. 1509.
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at a disadvantage prospective candidates whose religious con-
victions would not permit them to attend on a given date. 9 In
the context of steel industry regulation, these principles pro-
duce the consequence that the Commission of the European
Communities ("Commission") is bound to demonstrate consis-
tency in imposing fines on undertakings which exceed their pro-
duction quotas.' 0 In the area of trade regulation, these
principles imply that a regulation will be invalidated if it estab-
lishes more rigorous standards for the determination of the ori-
gin of cotton yarn than for that of other cloth and fabrics.'1
These principles also have a particular importance in the agri-
cultural sector, for the EEC Treaty provides that:
[tlhe common organization established in accordance with para-
graph 2 of this Article may include all measures required to
achieve the objectives set out in Article 39, in particular price con-
trols, subsidies for the production and distribution of various
products, stock-piling and carry-over systems and common ar-
rangements for stabilisation of imports and of exports. The com-
mon organization shall confine itself to pursuing the objectives set
out in Article 39 and shall exclude any discrimination between
producers or consumers within the Community (emphasis
added). 12
Thus in the "Quellmehl" cases' 3 and in the "Gritz" cases' 4 the
Court of Justice held that the Council of the European Com-
munties ("Council") had infringed the general principle of
equality by abolishing production refunds on maize used to
make quellmehl and gritz while continuing to pay refunds on
maize used in the manufacture of starch.'5 The Court referred
to Article 40(3) of the Treaty and commented:
While this wording undoubtedly prohibits any discrimination be-
tween producers of the same product, it does not refer in such
9 Case 130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1589.
10 Case 234/82, Ferrieredi Roe Volciano, 1983 E.C.R. 3921.
11 Case 162/82, Paul Cousin and Others, 1983 E.C.R. 1101.
12 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 40(3) as amended.
13 Joined Cases 117/76 & 16/77, Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Hansa-
Lagerhaus Str6h & Co v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen, 1977 E.C.R. 1753.
14 Joined Cases 124/74 & 20/77, SA Moulins et Huileries de Pont-A-Mousson
v. Office National Interprofessionnel des Cdrdales, Socit6 Coop6rative "Providence
Agricole de la Champagne" v. Office National Interprofessionnel des Cr6ales,
1977 E.C.R. 1795.
15 Albert Ruchdeschel, 1977 E.C.R. at 1757; SA Moulins, 1977 E.C.R. at 1811.
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clear terms to the relationship between different industrial or
trade sectors in the sphere of processed agricultural products.
This does not alter the fact that the prohibition of discrimination
laid down in the provision cited is merely a specific enunciation of
the general principle of equality which is one of the fundamental
provisions of Community law. This principle requires that simi-
lar situations shall not be treated differently unless the differenti-
ation is objectively justified. 16
The proposition that comparable situations should not be
treated differently, in the absence of objective justification,17 is
more easily stated than applied. For a significant element of
subjectivity is involved in asserting that situations are "compa-
rable," that treatment is "different," or that such differences are
objectively justified. '8 An understanding of the meaning of this
principle may begin with an appreciation of the fact that it is
not a creature of the law of the European Union. Like others of
the general principles commonly proclaimed as the progeny of
the European Court, it is an adopted infant, originating in na-
tional and public international law.19
This paper reviews the law of the discrimination as it has
developed in the European Union. Two parts organize this dis-
cussion. The first part outlines the law of equality in public in-
ternational law and the second deals with the application of
these general principles in the law of the European Union.
I. EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A brief review of public international law shows that the
law of equality is embodied in several sources. To begin with,
the International Law Commission ("ILC") has on several occa-
16 SA Moulins, 1977 E.C.R. at 1810.
17 Case 147/79, Hoechstrass v. Court of Justice, 1980 E.C.R. 3005, 3019; Case
810/79, UOberschfir v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt f'ir Angestellte, 1980 E.C.R.
2747, 2764-5.
18 On the subject, see generally F. CAPOTORTI, LE PRINCIPE DE L'gGALrr EN
DROIT 9CONOMIQUE (1984); C. Schmitthof, The Doctrines of Proportionality and
Non-Discrimination, 2 EuR. L. REV. 329 (1977); B. Sundberg-Weitman, Addressees
of the Ban on Discrimination Enshrined in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty, 10 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 71 (1973); J. Schwarze, Der Schutz des Gemeinschaftsburgers durch
allgemeine Verwaltungsrechtsgrundsdtze im EG Recht, 1986 N.J.W. 1067.
19 See P. Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Com-
munity, 8 EuR. L. REV. 155 (1983).
[Vol. 7:57
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sions expressed the view that there exists as a matter of public
international law a principle of non-discrimination. It has char-
acterized this as a "general rule which flows from the equality of
States," 20 and as a "general rule inherent in the sovereign
equality of States."21 Dealing with most-favored-nation clauses,
the ILC has referred to "the general principle of non-discrimina-
tion" which "may be considered as a general rule that can al-
ways be invoked by any State."22 Numerous multilateral
treaties prepared by the ILC encompass a duty to refrain from
discrimination: among these are the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations, 23 the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions,24 and the Vienna Convention on the Representation of
States in their Relations with International Organizations of a
Universal Character. 25
Additionally, the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations26
proclaims that:
[s]tates have a duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of
differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the
various spheres of international relations, in order to ... promote
... international cooperation free from discrimination based on
such differences. 27
Several of the central provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") are devoted to the abolition of
discrimination.2 Under other conventions, States have a duty
20 [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 105, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4ISER.A/1958.
21 [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 128, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1961.
22 [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 2, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4ISER.A/1978.
23 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 47, Cmnd.
2565, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
24 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 72, Cmnd.
5219, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
25 Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with Interna-
tional Organisations of a Universal Character, Mar. 14, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
67/16; 69 Am.J. Int'l. L. 730 (1975).
26 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970); 65 Am.
J. Intl L. 244 (1971).
27 Id. at 248.
28 GENERAL AGREEMENT OF TAuRIFs AND TRADE, Geneva, Oct. 30, 1947, Cmnd.
7258, art. I, XIII & XIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. See generally E. McGovERN, INTRNA-
1995]
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to refrain from discrimination between individuals within their
jurisdiction. Among the most notable of the United Nations
("U.N.") conventions imposing such an obligation are the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,29 the Interna-
tional Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,30
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination.3 1 Indeed, the late Dr. McKean
concluded "that the principles of equality and non-discrimina-
tion, in view of their nature as fundamental constituents of the
international law of human rights, are part of the jus cogens"
(emphasis in original).3 2
It is also clear, however, that the principle of equality in
public international law constitutes no obstacle to the granting
of special favours or dispensations by one State to another. In
the words of the ILC: "States are free to grant special favours to
other States on the ground of some special relationship of a geo-
graphic, economic, political or other nature."33
Indeed, treaties may create special obligations on States to
discriminate in favor of other contracting parties as in the case
of Commonwealth preferences in international trade.34 Dis-
crimination in favor of less developed countries is a feature of
several multilateral legal instruments concluded in recent
years, among which may be cited the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States35 and the Lom6 Conventions be-
TIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, (2d ed. 1986).
29 INTERNATIONAL CONVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, New York,
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 2, 3, 4, 6, 14, 16, & 23-27, Cmnd. 6702, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). In particular, Article 26 provides that "all per-
sons are equal before the law" and that "the law shall prohibit discrimination."
30 International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New
York, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2-7 & 10, Cmnd. 6702, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXX).
31 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, New York, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 2-5, 7 & 10, Cmnd. 4108, 660 U.N.T.S.
195.
32 McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 283
(1983). Support for this view is found in the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Case, 1970 I.C.J. 33-
4, and in its Opinion in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 131. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 598-601 (4th ed. 1990).
33 [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 12, 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4ISER.A/1978.
34 See J.H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 264-72 (1969).
35 Charter of Economic Rights and Duty of States, New York, Dec. 12, 1974,
G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX). See J.F. Dorsey, Preferential Treatment: A New Standard
[Vol. 7:57
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tween the European Communities and the African-Caribbean-
Pacific (ACP) States.36
Thus, mere differences of treatment do not constitute
breaches of the rule against discrimination. As a matter of pub-
lic international law, discrimination occurs "where those who
are in all material respects the same are treated differently, or
where those who are in material respects different are treated
in the same way."37 Dealing with discrimination as an aspect of
human rights, Dr. McKean stated as follows:
[i]t is now generally accepted that the provision of special meas-
ures of protection for socially, economically or culturally deprived
groups is not discrimination, so long as these special measures
are not continued after the need for them has disappeared ....
The other type of protective measure which is permissible is the
provision of special rights for minority groups to maintain their
own languages, culture and religious practices and to establish
schools, libraries, churches and similar institutions... 'Discrimi-
nation' is defined under international law to mean only unreason-
able, arbitrary or invidious distinctions, and does not include
special measures of protection of the two types described above
.... The principle of equality of individuals under international
law does not require mere formal or mathematical equality but a
substantial and genuine equality in fact.38
for International Economic Relations, 18 HARV. INT. L. J. 109 (1977); S.J. Rubin,
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 69 PRoc. A.S.I.L. 225 (1975);
S.A. Tiewul, The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
10 J. INT. LAw & ECON. 645 (1975); J.C. Vanzant, The Charter on Economic Rights
and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development-Aid Problem?, 4 GA. J. INT. &
CoMP. L. 441 (1974).
36 Lom6 Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, U.K.T.S. No 47 of 1992; Cm. 1999; 1991
O.J. (L 229) 287. The Lomd Convention provides for the more favourable treatment
of ACP States than of other States generally, subject to a prohibition of discrimina-
tion between the various ACP States; but special treatment is accorded to the
"least-developed ACP States" as defined in Article 257 of the Lomd Convention. By
Article 132 of the EEC Treaty, Member States of the EEC are to apply in their
trade with the ACP States the same treatment as they accord to each other pursu-
ant to the EEC Treaty; and each ACP State is to apply to its trade with the Mem-
ber States and with the ACP States the same treatment as it applies to the
European State with which it has special relations.
37 1 R. JENNINGS & A. WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 378 (9th ed.
1992).
38 McKEAN, supra note 32, at 288.
1995]
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The final words of Dr McKean's formulation are, of course, de-
rived from those of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice in its Advisory Opinion in Minority Schools in Albania.39
Thus, the prohibition of discrimination in public interna-
tional law is allied to the concept of abus de droit: it is an aspect
of the avoidance of arbitrariness. 40 It is in this sense that the
prohibition has been understood both by the European Court of
Human Rights and by the Inter-American Court. The former
has concluded that discrimination exists if there is a difference
of treatment without an "objective and reasonable justification,
that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised."41 The Inter-Amer-
ican Court followed a similar approach. 42
II. BAsis OF THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNION
Article 7 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community provided that "[wlithin the scope of application of
this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special conditions con-
tained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality
shall be prohibited."43 That Article affords an insufficient basis
for the general principle of equality as it has developed in Euro-
pean Community law, for it applies only to discrimination on
grounds of nationality and it is limited by the two opening
clauses, particularly the words "within the scope of application
of this Treaty."44
39 Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 19 (April 6),
cited by Mr Advocate General Lagrange in Case 13/63, Italy v. Commission 1963
E.C.R. 165, 190. See further the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South
West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 250 at 284.
40 See X v. Conseil d'Etat du Canton de Zurich, 72 I.L.R. 574 (1974); Turkish
National Detention on Remand Case, 72 I.L.R. 263 (1971).
41 James, 75 I.L.R. 396, 429-430 (1986); Belgian Linguistics Case, 45 I.L.R.
114, 164-5 (1968).
42 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provisions of the Political
Constitution of Costa Rica, 79 I.L.R. 282, 299-300 (1984).
43 EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 7.
44 On this aspect of the subject, see generally B. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, DIscRIM-
INATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY: FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND FREEDOM
OF ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE EEC TREATY (1977); R. Herdegen, The Relations
between the Principles of Equality and Proportionality, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
683 (1985).
[Vol. 7:57
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The European Court has however taken the view that this
Article is merely a "specific expression"45 or "specific enuncia-
tion"46 of the general principle of equality. Accordingly, it con-
tains a general prohibition which must be applied in every
respect and in all the circumstances governed by Community
law to any person established in a Member State.47 Thus, the
general principle of equality is not derived from the Treaty;
rather, the rule in Article 7 of the Treaty is derived from a wider
and more ancient principle, which applies to all situations com-
prehensively. 48 As in the case of public international law, the
principle of equality denotes a form of abuse or disproportionate
conduct, normally (but not invariably) on the part of public
authorities, including Community institutions, entailing an ob-
jectively unjustified distinction between like cases, or an objec-
tively unjustified failure to distinguish between dissimilar
cases.
49
45 See among other examples Joined Cases 103 & 145/77, Royal Scholten-
Honig (Holdings) Limited v. Intervention Board of Agricultural Produce; Tunnel
Refineries Limited v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, 1978 E.C.R.
2037, 2081; Joined Cases 116 & 124/77, Amylum NV and Tunnel Refineries Lim-
ited v. Council and Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 3497, 3557; Case 138/79, Roquette
Fr~res v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3353; Case 139/79, Maizena v. Council, 1979
E.C.R. 3393, 3416; Joined Cases 201 & 202/85, Marthe Klensch v. Secrdtaire
d'Etat A l'Agriculture et a la Viticulture, 1986 E.C.R. 3477, 3507; Joined Cases 279,
280, 285 & 286/84, Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke and Others v. Commission,
1987 E.C.R. 1069, 1124; Joined Cases C-267 to C-285/88, Wuidart and Others v.
Laiterie cooperative eupenoise, 1990 E.C.R. 1-467, 480; Case C-177/90, Ralf-Her-
bert Kuhn v. Landwitrschaftskammer Weser-Ens, 1992 E..C.R. 1-35, 64.
46 See among other examples, Joined Cases 124/76 & 20/77, SA Moulins, 1977
E.C.R. at 1811; Case 245/81, Edeka Zentrale AG v. Federal Republic of Germany,
1982 .E.C.R. 2745, 2754; Case 281/82, Soci~tb A responsabilit6 limitk Unifrex v.
Commission and Council, 1984 E.C.R. 1969, 1986; Case 167/88, Association gdn~r-
ale des producteurs de bl6 et autres c~r~ales (AGPB) .v. Office national interprofes-
sionnel d6s c~r~ales (ONIC), 1989 E.C.R. 1653, 1684; Case C-44/89, Georg von
Deetzen v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5119, 5155.
47 Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1229; Case
137/85, Ministhre public v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, 2695.
48 Joined Cases 66, 127 & 128/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello State
v. Salumi, 1980 E.C.R. 1237, 1262; Case 131/73, Giuliano and Adriano Grosoli,
1973 E.C.R. 1555, 1566; Case 199/84, Procuratore della Repubblica v. Tiziano Mig-
liorini and Tibor Tiburzio Fischl, 1985 E.C.R. 3317, 3331; John Friedrich Krohn v.
Bundesanstalt fiir Landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 1985 E.C.R. 3997, 4022-
4023.
49 Italy v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. at 177-8.
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A. The Concept of Discrimination
The earliest of the cases in which the European Court was
called upon to define the concept of "discrimination" were those
presented to it in the context of Articles 2, 3, 4, 60 and 67 of the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") Treaty.50 The
first of these arose from the situation in Luxembourg, where the
Office Commercial du Revitaillement 51 maintained a monopoly
in the importing of solid fuels.5 2 That Office acted in conjunc-
tion with the Caisse de Compensation 53 which levied charges on
imported industrial coal in order to subsidize domestic fuels. 54
The question before the Court was whether the levy, represent-
ing a price rise for consumers of industrial coal and an advan-
tage for domestic users, was a measure or practice constituting
discrimination contrary to Article 4(b) of the ECSC Treaty.55
The Court concluded that it was not. The Court reasoned that
the increase in price imposed by the Caisse de Compensation
was applied in Luxembourg to all solid fuels for non-domestic
use regardless of their origin.56 As such, it affected all Commu-
nity producers who sold in Luxembourg coal for non-domestic
use "just as it would affect producers of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg if coal mines were to be discovered and worked
50 The second paragraph of Article 2 requires States to bring about progres-
sively conditions which will ensure the most rational distribution of production
and to take care not to provoke disturbances in the economies of Member States.
Article 3(b) requires Community institutions to ensure that comparably placed
consumers in the common market have equal access to sources of production. Arti-
cle 60 prohibits pricing practices contrary to Articles 2 and 3, in particular discrim-
inatory practices involving, within the common market, the application by a seller
of dissimilar conditions to comparable transactions, especially on grounds of the
nationality of the buyer. Article 4(b) provides that among the measures recognized
as incompatible with the common market are "measures or practices which dis-
criminate between producers." Article 67 requires Governments of Member States
to bring to the knowledge of the High Authority any action by the State which is
liable to have appreciable repercussions on conditions of competition in the coal or
steel industries. It authorises the High Authority to take steps where the Member
State's action is liable to provoke a serious disequilibrium.
51 The General Supplies Office is a statutory body which at the material time
was the sole importer of coal into Luxembourg.
52 Joined Cases 7 & 9/54, Industries Siddrurgiques Luxembourgeoisies v.
High Authority, 1954-6 E.C.R. 175, 197.
53 The Compensation Fund is an institution attached to the Office Commer-
cial de Ravitaillement by a Luxembourg Ministerial Order dated March 8, 1954.
54 Industries Siderurgiques Luxembourg, 1954-6 E.C.R. at 195.
55 Id. at 194.
56 Id. at 197.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/2
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there."57 Although the decision may appear formalistic, it can
be defended on the ground that Article 26 of the ECSC Treaty
preserves each Member State's liberty to conduct its own eco-
nomic policy.58
A few years later, however, the Court of Justice offered a
wide definition of "discrimination" as the term appears in Arti-
cles 2, 3(b), 60 and 67 of the ECSC Treaty:59
[t]here may be considered as discriminatory in principle and, ac-
cordingly, prohibited by the Treaty, inter alia, measures or inter-
ventions, even those emanating from the High Authority, which
are calculated, by substantially increasing differences in produc-
tion costs, otherwise than through changes in productivity, to give
rise to an appreciable disequilibrium in the competitive positions
of the undertakings concerned. In other words, any intervention
attempting to distort or actually distorting competition artificially
and significantly must be regarded as discriminatory and incom-
patible with the Treaty, while measures which take into account
the internal organization of an undertaking and the use by it of
its own resources cannot be regarded as discriminatory.60
In that case the applicant company sought the annulment of
certain letters sent by the High Authority to the Caisse de P6r6-
quation des Ferailles Import6es and the Office Commun des
Consommateurs de Feraille. It appeared from those letters that
the High Authority did not regard as part of a company's "own
resources" (exempted from charges in favor an the equalization
fund) ferrous scrap supplied by a works run under another com-
pany name. This was so even where there were close financial
or administrative links between the user and supplier. 61 The
Court concluded that the High Authority's position was lawful
since the later was not participating in the ferrous scrap market
which gave rise to the charge in favor of the equalization fund
but the consumption of ferrous scrap. The Court rejected the
argument that the High Authority had acted unlawfully in
57 Id. at 195-96.
58 See Case 8/55, F~d~ration Charbonnibre de Belgique v. High Authority,
1954-6 E.C.R. 245; Case 9/55, Soci4th des Charbonnages de Beeringen, Soci~t6 des
Charbonnages de Houthalen, Socidtd des Charbonnages de Helchteren et Zolder v.
High Authority, 1954-6 E.C.R. 311.
59 Joined Cases 32 & 33/58, Soci6td Nouvelle de Pontlieue Aci~ries du Temple
v. High Authority, 1959 E.C.R. 127, 143.
60 Id. at 142.
61 Id. at 143.
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drawing a distinction between bought ferrous scrap and its own
resources.6 2 The distinction did not give rise to unlawful dis-
crimination since It]he use of its own arisings by a single un-
dertaking producing steel and using ferrous scrap amounts to a
production recycling of one of its by-products."63 Presumably
the Court took the view that the use by one company of another
company's by-products could not be described as "recycling,"
where the supplier was legally independent, even though it was
financially and administratively linked to the user.
The Court elaborated on that reasoning in Klckner v. High
Authority.64 There, the company argued that the contested De-
cisions put it in an unfavourable position in relation to simi-
larly-placed competitors by subjecting to the equalization levy
deliveries of ferrous scrap by one company within the KIockner-
Werke AG Group to another. The applicant company stated
that at the material time it was in an identical situation, as
regards production, to that of competing undertakings in the
form of a single legal person comprising different branches. The
Court did not accept that its situation was identical for the pur-
poses relevant to the levying of the charge:
[flor the High Authority to be accused of discrimination it must be
shown to have treated like cases differently, thereby subjecting
some to disadvantages as opposed to others, without such differ-
ence being justified by the existence of substantial objective differ-
ences. On the other hand, in this case, in spite of identical
circumstances as regards production, the applicants by reason of
their legal structure incorporating several undertakings were not
in a similar position to that of their competitors who formed a
single legal entity. This difference is of importance in law and is
therefore capable of justifying different treatment (emphasis
added).65
The Court therefore declared itself unconvinced by the argu-
ments advanced by the applicant, stressing the close ties be-
tween the parent and subsidiary companies within the
Klockner-Werke AG Group. The Court considered that the
practice followed by the High Authority could be defended on
62 Id. at 148.
63 Socittd Nouvelle, 1959 E.C.R. at 143.
64 Joined Cases 17 & 20/61, K1bckner v. High Authority, 1962 E.C.R. 325.
65 Id. at 344.
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grounds of practicability and certainty. To extend the exonera-
tion to supplies between separate legal entities having adminis-
trative and financial links would produce uncertainty, in view of
the infinite variations in the financial and administrative links
between companies. The Court therefore concluded that the ap-
plicant had failed to show "that the criterion adopted in the ba-
sic Decisions is either irrelevant or purely arbitrary or that in
itself it involves discrimination."66
The lesson to be drawn from these cases is that there is no
discrimination within the meaning of the relevant Articles of
the ECSC Treaty where the undertakings subjected to different
treatment can be said to be objectively in different situations,
and the difference in their situations is one of which account
may properly be taken. A similar lesson can be drawn from
cases decided on the basis of the EEC Treaty. Thus in Sotgiu v.
Bundespost6 7 the Court considered with extreme caution the
permissibility of treating workers within the German Post Of-
fice differently, in respect of the grant of a separation allowance,
according to their places of residence. It restated its well known
proposition that the rules regarding equality of treatment, both
in the Treaty and in Article 7 of Regulation 1612/686s forbid not
only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all
covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other
criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result. There-
fore, the use of criteria, such as place of residence, could amount
to a disguised means of discriminating contrary to Community
law. This would not be the case, however, where the criterion
was designed to take account of objective differences which the
situation of workers involves. The Court stated that
[i]n any case it is not possible to state that there is discrimination
contrary to the Treaty and the Regulation, if it is apparent from a
comparison between the two schemes of allowances taken as a
whole that those workers who retain their residence abroad are
not placed at a disadvantage by comparison with those whose res-
idence is established within the territory of the State concerned. 69
66 Id. at 345.
67 Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. 153, 165.
68 Council Regulation 1612/68 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within
the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 2.
69 Sotgiu, 1974 E.C.R. at 164.
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Similarly in a social security case70 the Court reasoned that
the principle of equality did not render unlawful a difference,
indisputably created in German law, between, on the one hand,
German workers and foreigners residing on the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany and, on the other, workers from
other Member States. The variations in the financial burdens
from one individual case to another were in fact the result of
objectively different factual situations in which insured persons
might find themselves depending on the changes and chances of
working life.
In the light of this case law, Jirgen Schwarze has con-
cluded that "for discrimination of the kind prohibited under
Community law to be present, 'arbitrary' discrimination must
have taken place . . . public authorities commit discrimination
only when they discriminate arbitrarily."71
B. Comparable Situations
The obligation to ensure that comparable rates and condi-
tions shall be offered to comparably placed undertakings is
made explicit in the first paragraph of Article 70 of the ECSC
Treaty. In an early case, it was contended that comparison be-
tween undertakings must take into account "all the circum-
stances in which they are placed, in particular the place of
production, the profitability of the deposits worked and the fact
of being located in a less favoured region."72 The contention
was rejected by the Court, not only for textual reasons, 73 but
also on more general grounds. The concept of "discrimination"
could not be so narrowly interpreted as to require comparability
of undertakings in identical situations. Such a construction
would lead to the absurd result that an undertaking is only
comparable with itself. Rather, it appeared from Article 4 of the
Treaty that the intention of the authors was to eliminate distor-
tions in the Common Market by the harmonization of transport
70 Case 810/79, Dberschar v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fiir Angesteilte,
1980 E.C.R. 2747, 2765.
71 SCHWARZE, J. EURoPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 625 (1992).
72 Joined Cases 3-18, 25 & 26/58, Barbara Erzbergbau v. High Authority,
1960 E.C.R. 173, 191.
73 The provision appeared in the chapter headed "Transport." It was there-
fore necessary to interpret the expression "comparably-placed" as referring in prin-
ciple to the comparability of situations from the point of view of transport.
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rates and conditions. 74 The conclusion to be drawn was that in
the case of international transport, Article 70 required the abo-
lition of discrimination based on the point of departure or desti-
nation; and in the case of internal transport, it required that in
drawing up their tariff provisions the States should consider
transport conditions alone.
Undertakings or persons are said to be comparably placed,
for the purposes of the principle of equality, where the relevant
Treaty Article or statutory provision prohibits discrimination in
a particular respect in which the undertakings are placed com-
parably or where an obligation to refrain from discrimination
can be inferred, as a general principle, in a particular context in
which undertakings or persons are comparably placed. Thus in
Socigtg des Fonderies de Pont-d-Mousson v. High Authority75 re-
liance was placed on Article 3(b) of the ECSC Treaty, which re-
quires that Member States should ensure that comparably-
placed consumers in the common market should have equal ac-
cess to the sources of production. In that context, "comparably-
placed consumers" meant consumers of coal or steel in competit-
iton with one another:76
[d]iscrimination consisting of the dissimilar treatment of compa-
rable situations presupposes that there is a duty to treat all inter-
ested parties on the same footing and the possibility of so doing.
In this case the High Authority could only discriminate in the
manner alleged by the Applicant if it was empowered and bound
either to make the latter's competitors subject to equalization or
to exempt the applicant therefrom. 77
In that case, integrated steel foundries and independent steel
foundries were not in a comparable situation, for they were not
in a competitive relationship. 78
Subsequently in the "Quellmehl" cases 79 the Court posed
the question "whether quellmehl and starch are in a compara-
74 For this method of interpretation see Plender, The Interpretation of Com-
munity Acts by Reference to the Intentions of the Authors, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 57, 58 and
71 (1982).
75 Case 14159, Soci6t6 des Fonderies de Pont-A-Mousson v. High Authority,
1959 E.C.R. 215.
76 Id. at 231.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 232.
79 Albert Ruckdeschel, 1977 E.C.R. at 1753.
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ble situation, in particular in the sense that starch can be sub-
stituted for quellmehl in the specific use to which the latter
product is traditionally put."s0 On that issue there was a con-
flict: the plaintiffs asserting that the opportunities for substitu-
tion were no greater in 1977 than in 1974 (when Community
legislations ' was adopted on the basis that the two products
were comparable); and the Council and Commission asserting
that information recently made available to those institutions
led them to take a different view on the issue of substitutability.
The Court concluded:
[iut has not.., been established that, so far as the Community
system of production refunds is concerned, quellmehl and starch
are no longer in comparable situations. Consequently, these prod-
ucts must be treated in the same manner unless differentiation is
objectively justified.82
The Court established comparability by similar tests in the
"Gritz" cases 83 and in the "Isoglucose" cases.8 4
The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
in Article 7 of the EEC Treaty gives rise to several special diffi-
culties, two of which deserve attention in the present context.85
First, it has long been established that Article 7 does not aim at
the complete elimination of differences resulting from national
laws. 86 From this it follows that the application to traders in
one Member State of legislation more onerous than that im-
posed on similar traders in another Member State is not neces-
sarily prohibited. The two traders are not taken to be in a
"comparable situation." In other words, differences in treat-
80 Id. at 1770.
81 Council Regulation 1125/74, 1974 O.J. (L 128) 12, amending art. 11 of
Council Regulation 120/67. O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed., 1967, 33 on the common organiza-
tion of the market in cereals.
82 Albert Ruckdeschel, 1977 E.C.R. at 1770.
83 SA Moulins, 1977 E.C.R. at 1795. The court's words were "the possibility of
interchangeability." Id. at 1812.
84 Royal Scholten, 1978 E.C.R. at 2037. The Court noted that "as the markets
in sugar and isoglocose are closely linked ... any Community decision on one of
those products necessarily affects the other." Id. at 2078.
85 On the subject see A. TOTH, THE OxFoRD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN CoM-
MUNiTY LAW 190 (1990); 1 D. VAUGHAN, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMUIuiTiEs SER-
VICE 2.310 (1990).
86 See Rt. Hon. Lord Slynn of Hadley, in 1 D. VAUGHAN, LAW OF THE EuRo-
PEAN COMMUNITIES SERVICE 2.310 (1990).
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ment which result from divergencies between the laws of the
Member States are not necessarily contrary to the principle of
equal treatment so long as the provision of national law in ques-
tion affects all persons subject to it in accordance with objective
criteria and without regard to their nationality.8 7 Likewise a
difference in treatment resulting from natural phenomena does
not amount to unlawful discrimination. In the Court's words:
[d]ifferences, which are due to natural phenomena, cannot be de-
scribed as 'discrimination' within the meaning of the Treaty; the
latter regards only differences in treatment resulting from human
activity, and especially from measures taken by public authori-
ties, as dicrimination. Moreover, it should be pointed out that
even if the Community has in some respects intervened to com-
pensate for natural inequalities, it has no duty to take steps to
eradicate differences in situations such as those contemplated by
the national court.88
Second, Article 7 gives rise to the problem of so-called "re-
verse discrimination." 9 The question is whether a national of a
Member State is entitled as a matter of Community law to be
treated by the authorities of that State no less favorably than
that State is bound by Community law to treat a national of
another Member State. Stated more generally, the issue is
whether a national of a Member State is, in his relations with
that State, in a "comparable situation" with a national of an-
87 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 16; Case
223/86, Pesca Valentia v. Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, 1988 E.C.R. 83. The
Court has also ruled that treatment which works to the detriment of national prod-
ucts as compared with imported products and which is put into effect by a Member
State in a sector which is not subject to Community rules or in relation to which
there has been no harmonization of national laws does not come within the scope
of Community law. Case 355/85, Driancourt v. Cognet, 1986 E.C.R. 3231; Case 98/
86, Ministre Public v. Mathot, 1987 E.C.R. 819, 822.
88 Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Marc Debauve and Others, 1980 E.C.R.
833, 858.
89 F. BuRRows, FREE MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN CoMMuNrTY LAw 1189 (1987);
C. Greenwood, Nationality and the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons in Com-
munity Law 7 Y.B. EuR. L. 185 (1987); M. HOCKBAUM, DAS DISCRIMINIERUNGS UND
SUBVENTIONSVERBOT IN DER EGKS UND EINS (1962); S. Kon, Aspects of Reverse
Discrimination in Community Law, 6 EUR. L. REV. 75 (1981); D. Pickup, Reverse
Discrimination and Freedom of Movement for Workers, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
135 (1986). See generally H. SCHLACHTER, DIscRIMINATION A REBOURS: DIE IN-
LANDERDISKRIMINIERUNG NACH DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DER EuGH UND DAS
FRANZOSISCHEN CONSEIL D'ETAT (1984).
1995]
17
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 7:57
other Member State. In Saunders90 the Court of Justice con-
templated that the rights conferred on workers by Article 48
may lead the Member States to amend their legislation, where
necessary, even with respect to their own nationals. In Morson
and Jhanjan9i the Court added:
Article 7 and Article 48 may be invoked only where the case in
question comes within the area to which Community law applies,
which in this case is that concerned with freedom of movement of
workers wthin the Community. Not only does that conclusion
emerge from the wording of those articles, but it also accords with
their purpose, which is to assist in the abolition of all obstacles to
the establishment of a common market in which the nationals of
the Member States may move freely within the territory of those
States in order to pursue their economic interests. It follows that
the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for workers and
the rules adopted to implement them cannot be applied to cases
which have no factor linking them with any of the situations gov-
erned by Community law.92
It was not until July 1992 that the Court finally determined, in
the case of Surinder Singh,93 that Community law required a
Member State to grant leave to enter to the spouse, of whatever
nationality, of a national of that State, who has gone with that
90 Case 175/78, Vera Ann Saunders, 1979 E.C.R. 1129, 1135. For antecedent
case law, see Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, 1973 E.C.R. 101; Case 57/72,
Westzucher v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker, 1973 E.C.R. 321; Case 78/76,
Steinicke und Wesseling v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595; Case
115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1979 E.C.R. 399; Case
136/78, Ministbre Public v. Auer, 1979 E.C.R. 437. See also Case 246/80,
Broeckmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311, 2327; Case
180/83, Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemburg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539; Case 298/84, Iorio
v. Azienda Autonoma delle Ferrovie dello Stato, 1986 E.C.R. 251, 255; Joined
Cases 297/88 & 197/89, Massam Dzodzi, 1990 E.C.R. 3783.
91 Joined Cases 35 & 36/82, Elestina Esselina Christina Morson v. Nether-
lands; Sewradjie Jhanjan v. Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 3723, 3736.
92 Id. at 3736.
93 Case 370/90, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh ex
parte the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4265. On the
same date the Court of Justice resolved a related issue, which had also been the
subject of some long-standing controversy, in ruling that "[t]he provisions of Com-
munity law on freedom of establishment preclude a Member State from deying a
national of another Member State who posseses at the same time the nationality of
a non-member country, entitlement to that freedom on the ground that the law of
the host State regards him as a national of the non-member country." Case 369/
90, Micheletti and Others v. Delegaci6n del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-
4239.
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spouse to another State in order to work there as an employed
person and returns to establish himself in the State of which he
is a national.
National courts initially showed some reluctance to con-
clude that they were confronted with a factor linking the case to
any of the situations envisaged by Community law;94 but the
dam was broken in the case of Surinder Singh95 and it now ap-
pears likely that several novel issues of reverse discrimination
will present themselves both nationally and at the European
level.9 6
C. Objective Justification
The different treatment of comparably-placed persons or
undertakings entails no breach of the principle of equality if
such difference is objectively justified. The Court of Justice's
case law on the issue of "objective justification" does not reveal a
series of discrete principles. 97 Neverthless, the guiding princi-
ple appears to be two-fold: 1) the distinction drawn between
comparably-placed persons or undertakings must be based on
94 Hof van Cassatie, Belgium, Dec. 14, 1976, Oppenbaar Ministerie v. Herman
Le Compte, 1977 (1) Pas. Belge 430; High Court, London, Nov. 30, 1979, R v. Gov-
ernor of Brixton Prison ex parte Budlong, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 125; Court of Appeal,
London, Mar. 7, 1980, Narinder Singh Virdee, [1980] 1 C.M.LR. 709; Immigration
Appeal Tribunal, London, Oct. 29, 1981, Gobind Singh Mansukhani v. Secretary of
State [1981] Imm. A.R. 184; Conseil d'Etat, Belgium, Mar. 4, 1982, Canoot v. Bel-
gian State, Rec. Conseil d'Etat (1982) 474; Cour d'Appel, Luxembourg, Mar. 27,
1986, Gaston Vergel v. Conseil de rOrdre du Barreau de Diekirch, 26 Pas. Lux. 333
(1986); Cour d'Appel, Caen, Feb. 2, 1987, Ministore Public v. Patrick Dupong (un-
reported); Symvoulio tis Epikrateias, Mar. 24, 1988, lonnis Spiropoulos v. Ygeias
Ypourgon, [1989] Armenopoulos 919; Court of Appeal, London, Apr. 21, 1988: R v.
Secretary of State ex parte Tombofa, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 609; Cour de Cassation,
Paris, May 10, 1988, Patrick Dupont, 1988(4) J.C.P. 2417; Conseil d'Etat, Luxem-
bourg, 8 November 1989, Michble Maret v. Ministbre de l'dducation, Cour d'Appel,
Luxembourg, Mar. 27, 1986.
95 Surinder Singh, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4265. The determination of the Immigra-
tion Appeal Tribunal was made on Aug. 17, 1989.
96 See Stephanie Grant, The Incoming Tide, 142 NEw LAW J., 1167 (1992).
97 However, Professor Toth states that different treatment of comparably-
placed persons or undertakings is objectively justified where (i) it is justified by the
aims which Community institutions lawfully pursue as part of Community policy;
(ii) its purpose is to obviate special difficulties in one sector of industry; (iii) it is not
arbitrary in the sense that it does not exceed the broad discretion enjoyed by Com-
munity institutions; (iv) it is based on objective differences arising from the eco-
nomic circumstances underlying the common organization of the market in the
relevant products. TOTH, supra note 85, at 193.
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rational considerations and, 2) in drawing the distinction the
Member State or Community institution must not exceed the
bounds of the discretion reserved for it or conferred on it by the
applicable Community rule.
Thus in an early case the Court of Justice considered the
legitimacy of the different treatment of German exporters who
enjoyed the benefit of the system of monetary compensatory
amounts from German exporters who did not have such a bene-
fit. 98 The Court stated:99
[als regards the comparison made with German exporters of goods
which had had the benefit of this compensatory system from the
start, the different treatment of which the applicant complains
would not be a violation of the principle of non-discrimination un-
less it appeared to be arbitrary. It should be noted that in apply-
ing the last sentence of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 974/71100 the
Commission has wide powers of appraisal in judging whether the
monetary measures contemplated by the said regulation could
lead to disturbances in trade in agricultural products. (emphasis
added).
A few years later in Denkavit'0 1 the Court had to consider the
justification for a distinction drawn by German tax law between
agricultural livestock breeders and keepers on the one hand and
industrial livestock breeders and keepers, on the other. The lat-
ter were, in effect, excluded from the grant of aids for which the
former were eligible. The Court noted that Article 40(3) of the
EEC Treaty prohibits discrimination but stated that "different
treatment could be regarded as constituting discrimination only
if it appears to be arbitrary."10 2 The Court then examined the
basis for the distinction drawn by the German law:
[i]t appears from the case file inter alia that, because they use
fodder which is mostly their own farm produce, agricultural live-
stock breeders and keepers within the meaning of German tax
law are subject in particular to the risks inherent in working the
soil. On the other hand, industrial livestock breeders and keepers
98 Case 43/72, Merkur v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 1055, 1073.
99 Id. at 1073.
100 Council Regulation 974/71, on certain measures of conjunctural policy to be
taken in agriculture following the temporary widening of the margins of fluctua-
tion for the currencies of certain Member States; 1971 O.J. (L 106) 1.
101 Denkavit, 1978 E.C.R. at 1317.
102 Id. at 1333.
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within the meaning of German tax law are not exposed to the
same risks, as they buy the feeding-stuffs needed for their ani-
mals mostly on either the national or the international market,
and if their national currency is revalued, they are able to obtain
them abroad at advantageous prices. Accordingly the distinction
between agricultural livestock breeders and keepers and indus-
trial livetock breeders and keepers, which German tax law makes
in laying down a ratio between the head of livestock and the uti-
lized agricultural area, and which the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany adopted as an objective, albeit unmodulated,
criterion as regards the granting of aid which it is empowered to
grant ... cannot be regarded as discriminatory. 10 3
A similar approach has been followed under the ECSC
Treaty. In Finsider10 4 the applicant complained of a Commis-
sion Decision10 5 which introduced discrimination against un-
dertakings which had received national aid intended to offset
operating losses, by making it possible for undertakings which
had received other forms of national aid to obtain additional
steel quotas. The Court concluded that the distinction drawn
between the two categories of recipients of national aid was
based on "an objective and substantial criterion with regard to
the aims which the Community may lawfully pursue as part of
its industrial policy."10 6 This was because aid other than that
intended to cover losses (investment aid or aid for closure or
research and development) is in fact likely to encourage restruc-
turing and improvement of productivity. 10 7
In the case of the prohibition of discrimination between
men and women with respect to pay, the European Court has
ruled that the application of a criterion other than sex whose
effect is such that most male employees are treated more
favourably than most female employees is not prohibited in so
far as the different treatment "is attributable to factors which
are objectively justified and are in no way related to any dis-
103 Id. at 1333.
104 Case 250/83, Findsider v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 131.
105 Commission Decision 2748/83, 1983 O.J. (L 269) 55.
106 Findsider, 1985 E.C.R. at 153.
107 Since those were aims to be pursued by Community institutions as part of
industrial policy, the pursuit of those aims did not disclose a ddtournement de
pouvoir.
1995]
21
PACE INT'L L. REV.
crimination based on sex."108 In that case the Court appeared
to contemplate that two distinct tests are to be applied. The
national court was first to ascertain that the use of the appar-
ently neutral criterion was not designed to camouflage the em-
ployer's object of treating men more favorably than women:
that is what is meant by the words "in no way related to any
discrimination based on sex;" then it was to determine whether
there was an objective economic justification for the action of an
employer, innocent of any discriminatory objective, who re-
wards workers in such a way that more members of one sex
than of another are likely to benefit. 10 9 The particular case en-
visaged by the Court is that of the employer endeavoring on eco-
nomic grounds which may be objectively justified to encourage
full-time work irrespective of the sex of the worker. 1" 0 In the
result, a national court will apparently substitute its own judg-
ment for that of an employer on the question whether there is
an objective economic justification for the employer's policy with
respect to pay, where the incidental effect of the policy is to
favor members of one sex.
III. CONCLUSION
In a series of cases the Court of Justice has proclaimed that
the principle of equality or non-discrimination is a fundamental
rule of Community law. This was stated in the "Quellmehl"
cases where the Court stated, for the first time, that the prohi-
bition of discrimination in the relevant legislation was "merely
a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality which
is one of the fundamental principles of Community law.""' The
Court repeated this language in the "Isoglucose" cases 1 2 and
thereafter. 1" 3 The Court's statement not only emphasizes the
weight to be attached to the principle: it also indicates that it is
108 Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd, 1981 E.C.R.
911.
109 Id. at 925.
110 See Plender, Equal Pay for Men and Women: Two Recent Decisions of the
European Court, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 627 (1982).
111 Albert Ruckdeschel, 1977 E.C.R. at 1769.
112 Royal Scholten-Honig, 1978 E.C.R. at 2083.
113 See Case 245/81, Edeka Zentrale AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1982
E.C.R. 2745, 2754; Case 59/83, Bioviliac NV. v. European Economic Community,
1984 E.C.R. 4057, 4075; Case 215/85, Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaftsliche
Marktordnung v. Raiffeisen Hauptgenossenschaft eG, 1987 E.C.R. 1279, 1300.
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applicable, as a general principle of law, even where there is no
specific statutory rule requiring the equal treatment of persons
or undertakings in material respects. 114
The principle is therefore not based primarily upon statu-
tory formula. It is derived from a comparative examination of
national laws, in the same way as the corresponding general
principle of public international law. 115 Differences in treat-
ment deriving from natural phenomena cannot be considered
contrary to the principle of equality,116 nor are differences re-
sulting from divergencies between national laws in conflict with
this principle.117 Moreover, there is no general principle on
which natural persons may rely requiring the Community to af-
ford equal treatment in all respects to third countries."18 The
development of the principle remains in its infancy. The
formula repeatedly used by the Court of Justice is that similar
situations shall not be treated differently in the absence of ob-
jective justification; but the principle so expressed barely con-
ceals the qualitative judgments inherent in it: the assertion
that situations are similar and the equally qualitative assertion
that differences are (or are not) objectively justified.
Even as so expressed, the principle has close relations with
rules of public international law, whose existence can no longer
be questioned (even if their character as norms of jus cogens
remains to be proven). Although the principles at issue are gen-
eral, it is necessary that they should attain greater definition.
This indeed is required by another of the general principles
adopted by the Court of Justice: that of legal certainty. To
achieve definition it is appropriate to develop further character-
istics from the existing rules of public international law, and of
course from the laws of the Member States. There may also be
a strong case for adopting principles from the law of the United
States, at least in certain aspects of the rules relating to equal-
114 Case 265/78, H. Ferwerda BV. v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, 1980
E.C.R. 617, 628; Joined Cases 66 & 127-128/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze
delo Stat v. Meridionale Industria Salumi Srl and Others, 1980 E.C.R. 1237,
1263.
115 SCHWARZE, supra note 71, at 673.
116 Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 858.
117 Case 41/84, Pinna v. Caisse d'Allocations Familiales, 1986 E.C.R. 1, 24.
118 Case 55/75, Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. HauptzoUamt Berlin-Packhof,
1976 E.C.R. 19.
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ity. The Court of Justice has already done so in the field of
equal treatment of men and women1 19 and could with profit do
so in other areas as well.
119 Plender, supra note 110, at 652.
[VCol. 7:57
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/2
